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ABSTRACT
This paper theoretically and empirically investigates how the risk of future
adverse price changes created by the anticipated arrival of information in-
fluences risk-averse investors’ trading decisions in institutionally imperfect
capital markets. Specifically, I examine how the selling activity of individual
investors immediately following an earnings announcement is influenced by
the tradeoff between risk-sharing benefits of immediate trade and explicit
transaction costs imposed on such trades. Consistent with my theoretically
derived predictions, I find that investors’ current trading decisions are less
sensitive to the incremental transaction costs created by short-term capital
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gains taxes on trading profits, as both the duration and intensity of the risk
of future adverse price changes increase. This evidence is consistent with an
incremental cost to investors that results from the revelation of precise infor-
mation, which is commonly referred to as the Hirshleifer Effect.
1. Introduction
In efficient capital markets, stock prices adjust to reflect the arrival of new
information, which leads to stock price volatility (e.g., Fama [1970, 1991]).
Expected price volatility deriving from the anticipated arrival of new infor-
mation imposes an incremental welfare cost upon undiversified, risk-averse
investors by virtue of their exposure to the risk of adverse price changes
(Hirshleifer [1971], Verrecchia [1982]).1 In response, risk-averse investors
generally desire to trade shares prior to the arrival of information in order
to spread the economy’s aggregate risk while diversifying their idiosyncratic
risks.2
In an idealized capital market with frictionless trading, investors can
quickly and efficiently balance their portfolios to insure themselves against
adverse price changes in the future. However, the existence of costly trad-
ing frictions can constrain investors from trading to their desired portfo-
lios, leaving them exposed to incremental welfare costs associated with the
risk of adverse price changes from the arrival of new information. This ad-
verse welfare effect of the anticipated arrival of information is commonly
referred to as the Hirshleifer Effect (Hirshleifer [1971]).
In this paper, I identify a novel and powerful capital market setting in
which to test whether the Hirshleifer Effect can be detected empirically and
examine what dimensions of risk are most important to investors. Specifi-
cally, I examine the relation between trading volume (a theoretically moti-
vated surrogate for investor welfare) and the risk of adverse price changes
in the presence of trading frictions created by the existence of intertem-
poral tax discontinuities (hereafter ITDs). An ITD results from the incre-
mental capital gains tax rate applied to trading profits on shares held for
less than a requisite amount of time.3 In order to qualify for the lower long-
term capital gains tax, investors are required to hold assets for a requisite
amount of time (typically 12 months) before selling them or else incur the
1 Ceteris paribus, anticipated price volatility increases with the precision of the anticipated
information.
2 A prominent theoretical model of optimal risk-sharing in financial markets is the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe [1964] and Lintner [1965]. In the CAPM, risk-averse
investors seek to minimize their exposure to the risk of adverse price changes by holding a
diversified portfolio consistent with their individual preferences for risk.
3 Shackelford and Verrecchia [2002] coined the term intertemporal tax discontinuity, which
they define as “a circumstance in which different tax rates are applied to gains realized at one
point in time versus some other point in time” (p. 205). In the context of my study, an ITD
specifically refers to the difference in tax rates applied to long-term versus short-term capital
gains.
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higher short-term capital gains tax on trading profits. Given an ITD, risk-
averse investors face an economic tension between trading immediately to
an optimal risk-sharing portfolio at the cost of incurring an incremental tax
on realized trading profits, versus postponing trade to avoid the incremen-
tal tax while facing the risk of interim adverse price changes. This tension
embodies the Hirshleifer Effect and is the focus of this paper.
Guided by a two-period extension of the model proposed by Shackelford
and Verrecchia [2002], I empirically document that as price volatility in-
creases, traders become more willing to incur the ITD cost involved with
trading before satisfying the requisite ITD holding period in order to trade
closer to their optimal risk-sharing portfolio and insulate themselves against
anticipated price volatility. In essence, higher anticipated price volatility re-
sults in the incremental welfare cost of the anticipated arrival of informa-
tion dominating transaction costs associated with the ITD, which makes
investors more willing to pay the explicit ITD transaction cost to shed this
risk. An increase in the precision of anticipated information reduces the
sensitivity of investors’ trading decisions to ITD costs.
More specifically, I find that in weighing ITD costs against the risk of
adverse price movements, investors consider both the intensity and the du-
ration of the risk of adverse price changes. Intuitively, intensity captures the
risk of adverse price movements per unit of time, while duration captures
the amount of time that such risk must be held. For example, a trader may
have only a few days left in the requisite ITD holding period, but the risk
of adverse price movement is very intense during the short remaining in-
terval, creating incentives for the investor to trade now toward an optimal
portfolio to avoid adverse price movements. Likewise, even if intensity is
low, an investor with a significant amount of time before qualifying for the
favorable long-term tax rate can still have strong incentives to trade today
because the low-intensity risk must be held over a long time period.
First, I empirically examine the impact of the duration component of risk
on the association between trading activity and ITD costs following a quar-
terly earnings announcement. At a given point in time, investors in a firm’s
shares have purchased their shares at different times in the past, which
means they face a different duration of risk as well as a different ITD cost
because of the different prices paid for the shares. I exploit this variation in
the ITD and duration of risk tradeoff for a given firm’s investors at a given
point in time (e.g., following a quarterly earnings announcement) by in-
cluding separate ITD costs for each holding period relative to qualification
for the lower tax rate as separate explanatory variables in a regression ex-
plaining trading activity. This makes it possible to test whether the sensitivity
of trading activity to ITD costs decreases as the number of days remaining
until qualification increases (i.e., duration of risk increases). Consistent with
the Hirshleifer Effect, I find evidence that investors’ trading decisions be-
come less sensitive to ITD costs as the duration of the risk they face increases.
Specifically, the results indicate that an increase in the duration of risk from
one day to one year completely eliminates any ITD incentive to postpone
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trade because it imposes too high of an implicit cost on risk-averse investors,
which highlights the important economic costs associated with anticipated
information.
Second, using the average daily stock return volatility as a proxy for the
intensity of risk, I find evidence that the sensitivity of trading activity to ITD
costs decreases as the risk of adverse price changes per unit of time in-
creases (i.e., intensity increases). In other words, the higher the anticipated
price volatility, the less influential ITD incentives are on current trading de-
cisions as investors become more willing to trade now to hedge the more in-
tense risk, despite incurring higher tax costs. However, while the results are
statistically significant, the economic magnitude is less pronounced com-
pared to the duration of risk results discussed previously. Moving from the
lowest to highest intensity of risk reduces the sensitivity of investors’ trad-
ing decisions to ITD costs by 25.7%. This implies that for every $100 a
risk-averse investor postpones trading in a stock with low intensity of risk
in order to avoid paying any ITD taxes, they are willing to pay $5.04 in addi-
tional taxes on immediate trade for a stock with high intensity of risk when
the difference between the long-term and short-term tax rates is 19.6%.
Thus, varying the intensity of risk from one extreme to the other does have
a substantial economic impact on the sensitivity of trade to ITD costs, but
reflects only one fourth of the economic impact of the duration of risk.
Overall, these results contribute to our understanding of economic
costs associated with precise information when capital market frictions are
present. This stands in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom that
increasing the precision of information leads to an increase in investor
welfare (e.g., a lower cost of capital). For example, Neel Foster, a former
member of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, states that “More
information always equates to less uncertainty, and . . . people pay more for
uncertainty. In the context of financial information, the end result is that
better disclosure results in a lower cost of capital” (Foster [2003]). My study
illustrates that investor welfare is decreasing in the precision of anticipated
information when capital market frictions are present. In addition, I docu-
ment that this implicit welfare cost on investors will manifest through trad-
ing volume, but not stock price, which implies that the cost of capital may
be an incomplete measure of the net effect of information precision on
investor welfare (Gao [2010]).
A number of institutional constraints exist that may inhibit investors’ abil-
ity to optimally make trades, including incomplete capital markets (Merton
[1987]), short sale constraints and prohibitions (Diamond and Verrecchia
[1987]), bid-ask spreads (Constantinides [1986]), and taxes (Shackelford
and Verrecchia [2002]). While each of these transaction costs is potentially
important, I choose to examine the trading friction created by the incre-
mental ITD because it offers several important advantages in examining
the Hirshleifer Effect relative to other commonly studied transaction costs.
First, and most importantly, an ITD is a perfectly anticipated, time-
varying transaction cost with a finite amount of time until expiration. In
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order to qualify for the lower long-term capital gains tax rate, investors are
required to hold assets for a requisite amount of time.4 This is crucial for
empirical tests of the Hirshleifer Effect because it makes it possible to mea-
sure the specific time horizon over which investors assess the risk of adverse
price changes in determining the optimal tradeoff between risk and ITD
costs. In contrast, most other transaction costs, such as bid-ask spreads and
long-term capital gains taxes, do not have an anticipated time variation that
allows investors to optimally avoid them.5 For example, investors can avoid
paying long-term capital gains taxes by postponing the sale of their portfo-
lio until death. However, investors’ expectations over their life expectancy
are unobservable.
Second, an ITD represents a potentially significant trading cost to in-
vestors. Currently, the maximum ITD cost imposed on investors, equal to
the difference in the maximum statutory capital gains tax rates applied to
short-term and long-term gains, is 20% but has historically been as low as
0% (1988–1990) and as high as 30% (1982–1986). Finally, a large body
of empirical evidence supports an important role for ITD costs in shap-
ing investor demand and trading volume. For example, Blouin, Raedy, and
Shackelford [2003] find a negative and statistically significant association
between ITD costs and trading volume following quarterly earnings an-
nouncements. Reese [1998] finds similar evidence using a sample of IPO
firms. The collective evidence in the literature provides a strong foundation
for empirically exploiting the tension created by ITD costs to powerfully
isolate and test the Hirshlefer Effect.
This study contributes to a large body of literature, dating back at least
to Hirshleifer [1971], that theoretically examines the welfare implications
of anticipated information. Hirshleifer [1971] demonstrates that, in a pure
exchange economy, risk-averse investors are incrementally worse off (in ex-
pectation) if they are not allowed to contract (or trade) prior to the release
of anticipated information. Verrecchia [2001] refers to this as the adverse
risk-sharing effect of increased disclosure.6 While a large number of the-
ory papers have debated the merits of the Hirshleifer Effect, there is a lack
of empirical evidence to support its validity. Two exceptions include Quaid
and Morris [1993] and Lerman et al. [1996], which provide evidence of
the Hirshleifer Effect within a small sample medical setting. Specifically,
these studies find that subjects reject costless information related to free
4 Historically, the requisite holding period has been 6, 9, 12, and 18 months. The ITD
holding period of 12 months is the most common.
5 While the magnitude of bid-ask spreads and long-term capital gain tax rates can change
over time, the change is not fully anticipated (except in unusual circumstances) and thus does
not provide investors with an incentive known in advance of the event.
6 Subsequent studies formalize Hirshleifer’s argument (e.g., Marshall [1974], Hakansson,
Kunkel, and Ohlson [1982]) and develop theoretical models that examine the welfare role of
anticipated information using alternative assumptions and settings. See Verrecchia [1982],
Diamond [1985], Bushman [1991], Alles and Lundholm [1993], and Campbell [2004],
among others. Verrecchia (2001; section 4) provides an extensive review of this literature.
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screening for hereditary diseases because of a fear of losing an opportunity
to insure against the disease. In short, the empirical findings in these stud-
ies support the Hirshleifer Effect, but are difficult to generalize to a large
capital market setting.
It is not clear that investors in my setting are sufficiently risk-averse or sen-
sitive to ITD transaction costs to create the Hirshleifer Effect at an econom-
ically meaningful magnitude. For example, portfolio diversification may
eliminate some of the risk of adverse price changes or investors may have a
sufficiently high tolerance for risk to reduce the welfare implications associ-
ated with risk-sharing. In addition, the ITD transaction cost investors actu-
ally consider may be substantially less than the maximum statutory amounts
for a number of reasons. First, some investors may have held shares for the
requisite amount of time and qualified for the lower long-term capital gain
tax rate. These investors have no ITD incentive to postpone trading. Sec-
ond, a portion of any short-term capital gains accrued in one security may
be partially offset by short-term capital losses from another security in an
investor’s portfolio, leading to a lower ITD incentive to postpone trades.
Third, some investors, such as institutions, may be tax-exempt.7 The ex-
tent to which these countervailing forces are present works against finding
any evidence of the Hirshleifer Effect. Despite these mitigating factors, the
results presented in this paper are consistent with the notion that antici-
pated information directly influences investors’ trading behavior in a man-
ner consistent with the Hirshleifer Effect when ITD transaction costs are
present.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 outlines the con-
ceptual framework and empirical predication, section 3 describes the em-
pirical sample and variable definitions, section 4 presents the empirical
analysis and results, and section 5 concludes.
2. Conceptual Framework
My conceptualization of the impact of anticipated information on in-
vestor welfare and trading behavior builds on Shackelford and Verrecchia’s
(2002) model of market responses in the presence of an ITD. In their
model, risk-averse investors, chararacterd by a risk tolerance parameter, γ ,
are endowed with suboptimal risk-sharing portfolios and reduce their trad-
ing activity as part of an optimal strategy to avoid paying a capital gain tax
(τ) on trades prior to realizing a liquidating dividend. The key insight from
their model is that an increase in ITD transaction cost imposed on selling
shareholders leads to a reduction in the supply of shares available for pur-
chase and, therefore, an increase in the equilibrium price and a decrease
in trading volume.
7 See Shackelford and Shevlin [2001] and Blouin, Raedy, and Shackelford [2003] for a
comprehensive review of why capital gains taxes may not matter to investors.
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2.1 SHACKELFORD AND VERRECCHIA (2002)—EXTENSION
In this section, I extend the Shackelford and Verrecchia (SV) model to
allow risk-averse investors a second round of trade prior to the realization
of the liquidating dividend when the tax rate is equal to zero.8 Thus, in-
vestors can optimally avoid paying the capital gain tax in the first period by
postponing their trade until the second period. However, investors antici-
pate they will observe a public signal, ỹ = ũ + ε̃, between periods 1 and 2.
The noise in the signal, ε̃, is independently and normally distributed with a
mean of 0 and a precision (inverse of variance) of s . The information con-
tained in this signal creates an incentive for risk-averse investors to trade
in the first round to protect themselves from adverse price changes in the
second round despite having to pay a higher tax rate on their immediate
trades. Under these conditions, the equilibrium price (P1) and trading vol-





(1 − θτ) , (1)
V1 = V ∗ − γ θ (1 − θ) τP1
Var[P̃2]
≥ 0, (2)
where V ∗ is the optimal risk-sharing trading volume, Var[P̃2] = (1 + s−1)−1
is the variance of price in the second round of trading, P1 is the amount
of capital gain in the first round of trading, ū is the expected payoff of the
risky asset, x is the supply of the risky asset, and θ is the proportion of selling
investors in the economy.
Both expressions highlight the interaction between the ITD transaction
cost and anticipated information in forming the equilibrium price and trad-
ing volume. First, the ITD transaction cost imposed on selling sharehold-
ers in the first round of trade leads them to adjust their demand, which
changes the supply of shares available for purchase. Thus, an increase in
the ITD transaction cost reduces the supply of shares, which leads to an in-
crease in the equilibrium price and a decrease in the trading volume. This
effect is identical to the equilibrium behavior in Proposition 1 of SV.9
Second, the risk of adverse price changes creates an incentive to trade
immediately so that investors can insure themselves against adverse price
changes. Thus, an increase in the precision of the intermediate signal leads
to an increase in anticipated price volatility, which leads to a reduction in
the sensitivity of trading volume to the ITD cost. In other words, as an-
ticipated information becomes more precise, investors are more willing to
8 Given the development of the basic rational expectations model is relatively well devel-
oped in SV, I focus primarily on my extension of their model. Complete details of my model
are provided in the appendix.
9 The situation where selling shareholders demand compensation from buying sharehold-
ers for the capital gains taxes paid on trades is commonly referred to as the “lock-in” effect
(e.g., Landsman and Shackelford [1995], Klein [1999], Jin [2006], Dai et al. [2008]).
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incur the explicit tax cost of immediate trade in order to shed the implicit
welfare cost associated with the risk of holding the shares until the next
round of trade.
Given the wedge created by the ITD, both sellers and buyers are exposed
to the anticipated information, which causes them to simultaneously in-
crease their demand and supply of shares in order to shed their risk. The
increase in demand by buying shareholders leads to a price increase and
is simultaneously offset by the increase in supply by selling shareholders.
Thus, the equilibrium price does not depend on the precision of the antici-
pated information. In contrast, anticipated information does affect equilib-
rium trading volume as both buying and selling shareholders increase their
supply and demand, respectively, which increases trading volume. Investors
will trade more shares, despite having to pay the ITD transaction cost, as the
precision of anticipated information increases. In other words, investors are
willing to pay the explicit transaction cost in order to reduce the implicit
utility cost imposed by exposure to adverse price changes stemming from
the anticipated arrival of new information.
At one extreme, when the anticipated signals provide no additional in-
formation (i.e., s → 0), investors know exactly what the price in the second
round of trading will be because they know there will be no new informa-
tion to update their beliefs about the underlying value of the risky asset.
Consequently, investors will not trade in the first period because they can
avoid paying the ITD without any risk of adverse price changes in the sec-
ond period.
At the other extreme, when the anticipated signals are expected to fully
reveal the payoff of the risky asset (i.e., s → ∞), investors trade as close as
possible to the optimal risk-sharing allocation despite having to pay the ITD
transaction cost.10
2.2 EXPECTED UTILITY AND THE HIRSHLEIFER EFFECT
The results of the previous section demonstrate that the existence of an
ITD transaction cost creates an incentive to not trade to an optimal risk-
sharing portfolio, which leaves investors exposed to the risk associated with
anticipated information. This exposure implies that individual investor wel-
fare, defined as expected utility (Ū ) in the first round of trade, is weakly de-
creasing in the precision, s , of the anticipated signal when an ITD transac-
tion cost, τ , is present (i.e., the Hirshleifer Effect). In the absence of an ITD
(i.e., τ = 0), each investor’s expected utility is not affected by the precision
of the anticipated signal, s . However, in the presence of an ITD transaction
cost (i.e., τ > 0), their expected utility is decreasing in the precision of the
10 By allowing s to go to ∞, my model effectively collapses to the one-period model of
Shackelford and Verrecchia [2002]. Thus, the SV model may be viewed as an extreme case of
my model, which leaves no scope for varying the role of anticipated information, which is the
focus of my paper.
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This result, which is derived in the appendix, illustrates the Hirshleifer
Effect. In the absence of an ITD transaction cost, investors are not con-
strained from trading in the first period and, therefore, immediately trade
to the optimal risk-sharing portfolio prior to the release of the anticipated
signal prior to the second round of trade. Thus, the investors optimally in-
sulate themselves from risk of adverse price changes in the second period,
which makes them insensitive to the precision of the anticipated informa-
tion signal. In contrast, the presence of an ITD in the first period drives
a wedge between the equilibrium and an optimal risk-sharing allocation,
which exposes investors to the risk of adverse price changes stemming from
the anticipated arrival of new information in the second round of trade. An
increase in the ITD cost creates a larger wedge, which, in turn, leads to a
larger scope for anticipated information and increases the sensitivity of in-
vestors’ expected utility to the precision of the anticipated information.
This is consistent with the pure exchange model in Hirshleifer [1971]
in which investors are not allowed to trade prior to the release of the an-
ticipated public signal. A key difference in my model is that investors are
not forbidden from trading prior to the signal, but instead are given a real
monetary incentive to postpone trading in order to avoid paying the ITD
transaction cost. This feature of the model facilitates an empirical test of
the Hirshleifer Effect by examining how variation in the precision of antic-
ipated information changes the sensitivity of investors’ trading decisions to
ITD transaction costs.
2.3 EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS
The investor welfare results in the previous section cannot be directly
tested because investors’ expected utility is not observable. As discussed
above, the interaction between ITD costs and the precision of anticipated
information is expected to affect trading volume, but not stock price.
Therefore, in this section I develop empirical predictions related to trad-
ing volume to test for evidence consistent with the Hirshleifer Effect.
Equation (2) illustrates the key economic tension of the paper. Actual
trading volume is less than optimal risk-sharing volume by an amount pro-
portional to the ratio of the aggregate ITD cost to the risk of an adverse
price change in the second round of trade. Specifically, as the ITD cost of
trading increases, investors trade less to avoid paying the explicit transac-
tion cost. That is, trading is (weakly) decreasing in the ITD incentive among
investors and results in a negative association between trading volume and
the ITD cost. This is the main result derived in the SV model and empiri-
cally supported by subsequent studies (e.g., Blouin, Raedy, and Shackelford
[2003]). The key insight from my study is that investors also consider the
implicit welfare cost from the risk of adverse price changes stemming from
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the anticipated arrival of new information in subsequent periods. There-
fore, the negative relation between trading volume and the ITD incentive
among investors is (weakly) increasing (i.e., becoming less negative) in the
precision of the anticipated information, s . This occurs because investors’
trading decisions become less sensitive to the ITD transaction cost with in-
creases in the cost of anticipated information, captured by the variance of
future price. Investors are willing to pay the higher explicit ITD transaction
cost to reduce the implicit welfare cost created by anticipated information
and the risk of future adverse price movements. In other words, anticipated
information imposes a cost on investors (i.e., the Hirshleifer Effect), which
is reflected in the comparative statics presented in the previous section.
The precision of the anticipated signal and, therefore, the total risk faced
by investors can be decomposed into a duration component and an inten-
sity component. Intuitively, duration captures the amount of time that the
risk must be held until qualification for the lower rate, while intensity cap-
tures the risk of adverse price movement per unit of time. Both effects lead
to the two main empirical predictions. The first empirical implication re-
lates the duration component of risk and is stated as follows:
Empirical Implication 1 The negative impact of ITD costs on trading activity
following an earnings announcement is mitigated (i.e., is less negative) as the time
to qualification increases (i.e., the duration of risk increases).
As the time to qualification increases, an investor must remain exposed
to the risk of adverse price movements over a longer period. Therefore,
investors optimally trade more shares today to reduce risk, despite the neg-
ative wealth effect of paying the higher short-term tax rate on trading prof-
its. The second empirical implication relates the intensity component of risk
and is stated as follows:
Empirical Implication 2 The negative impact of ITD costs on trading activity fol-
lowing an earnings announcement is mitigated (i.e., less negative) as the intensity
of risk per unit of time increases.
As the intensity of risk per unit of time increases, investors are more will-
ing to trade early, despite the higher taxes, to insulate themselves against
the higher implicit welfare costs associated with the risk of adverse price
changes.
3. Empirical Sample and Variable Definitions
3.1 SAMPLE SELECTION
To test my empirical predictions, I examine trading activity around quar-
terly earnings announcements. While quarterly earnings announcements
are not an inherent aspect of the conceptual framework, such a setting
provides two benefits. First, quarterly earnings announcements provide a
large sample setting associated with trading activity (e.g., Beaver [1968],
Morse [1981], Bamber [1986], Landsman and Maydew [2002]). As a result,
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quarterly earnings announcements are likely to satisfy the theoretical crite-
rion of “given that investors desire to trade” and thus provide a relatively
powerful setting to detect whether risk and ITD incentives interact to influ-
ence trading volume in a manner consistent with the Hirshleifer Effect.11
Second, a necessary condition for the existence of a relation between
risk and trading activity is that ITD incentives have to influence investors’
trading decisions.12 Consistent with this necessary condition, Blouin, Raedy,
and Shackelford [2003] and Hurtt and Seida [2004] document evidence of
a negative and significant association between ITDs and trading volume
around quarterly earnings announcements. This supporting evidence pro-
vides prima facie motivation for examining the role of risk in mitigating the
sensitivity of trading to ITD transaction costs around quarterly earnings an-
nouncements.
I begin by collecting data on all NYSE-listed firms with an available quar-
terly earnings announcement date between 1982 and 2002, as found in
Compustat. Next, I eliminate observations with a quarterly earnings an-
nouncement falling on a date when the requisite ITD holding period is
not equal to 12 months.13 Finally, I require that each observation has the
necessary data from Compustat, CRSP, I/B/E/S, Thomson Financial, TAQ,
and ISSM to compute all variables used in the empirical analysis. The final
sample contains 35,222 quarterly earnings announcement observations.
3.2 VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
The empirical implications developed in section 2 rely upon three impor-
tant measures: (1) trading volume (the outcome or dependent variable),
(2) the ITD incentive to postpone trading, and (3) the risk incentive to
trade immediately. In this section, I describe the empirical proxies for each
of the three key measures as well as other control variables used in the em-
pirical analysis.
First, the dependent variable employed in multivariate tests is the cu-
mulative three-day abnormal selling activity by individual investors, AVOL,
around quarterly earnings announcements. Using intra-day trading data
11 If ITD transaction costs matter to investors, then they should affect trading volume on all
trading days throughout the year. Therefore, any impact of ITD transaction costs on trading
activity around quarterly earnings announcement dates may be understated relative to the
actual effect as a result of the distortion in trading volume from the ongoing, unobservable
influences of ITD transaction costs prior to the earnings disclosure. This biases against finding
any results consistent with the model’s predictions.
12 Absent an ITD transaction cost, investors will immediately trade to their optimal risk-
sharing portfolio to insulate themselves from future adverse price changes. In other words,
investors will trade to the same portfolio regardless of the risk of future adverse price changes,
implying that there is no relation between trading volume and risk. Thus, a necessary condi-
tion for such a relationship is the existence of a source of market friction, such as an ITD.
13 This filter excludes announcements made from June 23, 1985 through July 1, 1988 (six-
month holding period) and between July 29, 1997 and December 31, 1997 (18-month holding
period).
42 R. T. BALL
from the ISSM and TAQ databases and following Lee and Radhakrishna
[2000], I classify trades of less than $10,000 (in 1990-dollars) as made by
individual investors and determine the trade direction from the Lee and
Ready [1991] algorithm. Examining the selling activity of small trades in
this manner increases the likelihood of capturing selling activity by more
tax-sensitive individual investors.14
I compute a daily selling measure, St , for individual investors equal to the
natural logarithm of one plus the number of trades classified as sell orders
by individual investors. Following Hurtt and Seida [2004], expected daily
selling activity by individual investors for a given firm during each day of an
earnings release period, days t − 1 to t + 1, is the average of the daily indi-
vidual selling metric, St , for that firm during the 50 days immediately pre-
ceding day t − 1, after excluding prior three-day earnings announcement
windows. AVOL is then computed as the mean selling activity by individual
investors, St , less the expected daily selling activity over the three-day earn-
ings announcement period scaled by the standard deviation of St over the
50-day estimation period.15
Second, I construct an empirical proxy for the total ITD incentive, ITD,
aggregated across all investors at the earnings announcement. Individual
investor’s ITD incentive to postpone trading is the product of the difference
between the short-term and long-term capital gains tax rates, RATE , and
the change in stock price, Pn, from the time the shares were acquired to
the date of the earnings announcement. Consistent with prior ITD studies,
I define RATE as the maximum statutory short-term capital gains tax rate
less the maximum statutory long-term capital gains tax rate at the earnings
announcement date.
The change in stock price at the announcement date, Pn, is defined as
the logarithm of the closing stock price on day t − 2, ln(Pt−2), minus the
logarithm of the initial purchase price (adjusted for stock splits and stock
dividends) on day t − n, ln(Pt−n), where n is the number of trading days
prior to the earnings announcement on which the asset was purchased.
Trading activity should reflect the aggregate ITD incentive and, therefore,
the aggregate price change among all investors on day t . Before aggregat-
ing price changes, it is important to note that a change in price with respect
to a given day in the past may not induce a strong ITD effect on abnormal
trading activity around the earnings announcement if relatively few shares
were traded on that particular day. In other words, if very few shares were
transacted on day t − n, then there is a low probability that an investor trad-
ing at the earnings announcement date purchased shares on t − n. The
price change computed for this day should receive a lower weight than a
14 Results are quantitatively similar if cutoff values of less than $5,000 or $20,000 are used
to proxy for trades made by individual investors.
15 In an untabulated analysis, I construct an alternative measure of abnormal trading vol-
ume around the earnings announcement using the “market” model of Ajinkya and Jain
[1989]. All inferences reported in the paper are similar using this alternative specification.
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trading day with high volume when constructing an aggregate price change
measure.16 Therefore, I compute a volume-weighted average price change
̄P over the 248 trading days (i.e., within the requisite ITD holding period,







wn · [ln(Pt−2) − ln(Pt−n)],
where Pn is the daily volume-weighted change in price from t − n to t −
2 and wn is equal to the daily volume on day t − n divided by the firm’s
cumulative trading volume over the two years immediately preceding the
earnings announcement. Weighting price changes with respect to the two-
year trading volume implies that the sum of the daily weights applied to
days t − 250 to t − 3 will be less than one. This is intended to capture the
fraction of traders that may have already held shares for more than one
year and are no longer subject to an ITD.17 The aggregate ITD incentive to
postpone trading, ITD, is estimated as the product of RATE and ̄P .
Third, I consider empirical proxies for the total amount of risk each
investor considers. The total risk is an increasing function of both the
intensity and the duration of the anticipated price volatility. The duration
component represents the amount of time over which a given risk in-
tensity must be held. It is defined as the number of trading days an in-
vestor who purchased shares on day t − n has remaining until qualifica-
tion for the lower tax rate. Specifically, duration, d, is equal to 250 − n
and is expressed in number of trading days.18 Consequently, within a sin-
gle observation, d will vary among investors depending on the number
of trading days, n, prior to the announcement date that each investor
purchased shares. The intensity component represents the risk of adverse
price changes per unit of time (e.g., per trading day). I define INTEN-
SITY as the variance of firm-specific daily stock returns in excess of the
16 The volume traded on a past date will not necessarily be held up to or traded on the
earnings announcement date. This makes past daily volumes a noisy proxy for the cross-section
of investors trading around the earnings announcement.
17 For example, consider an earnings announcement observation where the firm’s total
trading volume over the prior 24 months is 400,000 shares. If only 100,000 shares were traded
in the most recent 12 months, then the estimate of ̄P for this observation receives a total
weight of 1/4 (or 100,000/400,000). This assumes that 25% of investors trading at the earn-
ings announcement date are potentially subject to an ITD at the earnings announcement.
Conversely, if 300,000 of the 400,000 shares were traded in the most recent 12-month period,
then the estimate of ̄P for this observation receives a total weight of 3/4, three times the
weight of the other observation. Inferences do not change when cumulative three-year and
five-year trading volume are used instead.
18 This definition is a direct result of constraining my sample to time periods with a one-year
(or approximately 250 trading days) ITD requisite holding period. For example, investors who
purchased shares 100 trading days before the earnings announcement date will have exactly
150 trading days remaining in their ITD requisite holding period (i.e., 250 − 100 = 150).
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risk-free rate estimated over the 100 trading days immediately preceding
day t − 1.19
In addition, I also control for the influence of several factors that prior
empirical research has found to be associated with trading volume around
quarterly earnings announcements. The absolute value of unexpected
earnings, AUE , is intended to control for the information made available
at the earnings announcement (Bamber [1987]). AUE is equal to the abso-
lute value of actual quarterly earnings per share announced on day t minus
the median analyst forecasts reported by I/B/E/S over the 60 trading days
prior to day t − 1. In addition, I include the square of unexpected earnings,
NONLINEAR , to capture any nonlinearities (e.g., Freeman and Tse [1992],
Hurtt and Seida [2004]).
A number of factors related to the availability of preannouncement infor-
mation and prior information disclosure are included as control variables.
Firm size, SIZE , is the logarithm of market value of equity measured at the
fiscal quarter-end preceding day t and is a proxy for the level of prior in-
formation disclosure (Bamber [1986, 1987], Atiase and Bamber [1994]).
NUM EST is the logarithm of the number of analysts issuing a quarterly
earnings forecast within 60 days prior to day t − 1 and is a proxy for the
rate of information flow (Hong, Lim, and Stein [2000]).
Finally, I include a proxy for the bid-ask spread at the earnings announce-
ment date. The bid-ask spread represents another important transaction
cost to investors that may influence their decisions to trade. Atkins and
Dyl [1997] provide empirical evidence that annual trading volume is de-
creasing in the magnitude of the bid-ask spread. Following Atkins and Dyl
[1997], I compute the average bid-ask spread, BID ASK , for each observa-
tion as follows:




ASK j,t−n − BID j,t−n
(ASK j,t−n + BID j,t−n)/2 ,
where BID j,t−n and ASK j,t−n are the closing bid and ask prices for firm j on
day t − n.
4. Empirical Analysis
The purpose of this section is to test the empirical predictions from sec-
tion 2. Section 4.1 presents univariate statistics for selected regression vari-
ables. In section 4.2, I empirically examine whether ITDs significantly in-
fluence the selling activity of individual investors around quarterly earnings
announcement dates. Next, I present the fundamental empirical contribu-
tions of the paper by testing how risk influences the sensitivity of trading
19 In section 4.4, I also consider a number of other proxies for the intensity component of
risk, such as idiosyncratic and systematic return volatilities, as well as the skewness of the daily
return distribution.
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T A B L E 1
Sample Distribution
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1st 25th Median 75th 99th
AVOL 1.556 1.579 −1.107 −0.240 1.287 2.802 5.508
RATE 0.124 0.079 0.000 0.030 0.116 0.196 0.300
̄P 0.014 0.109 −0.323 −0.043 0.017 0.074 0.328
ITD 0.002 0.017 −0.056 −0.003 0.000 0.008 0.053
INTENSITY 0.063 0.064 0.008 0.025 0.043 0.077 0.315
UE −0.091 0.977 −4.800 −0.171 0.000 0.124 3.401
BID ASK 0.026 0.031 0.004 0.010 0.015 0.027 0.171
SIZE 4.681 15.628 0.055 0.380 1.013 3.059 68.801
NUM EST 7.293 5.402 1.000 3.000 6.000 10.000 24.000
The sample includes 35,222 observations of quarterly earnings announcements from 1982 to 2002. Let
t denote the quarterly earnings announcement date identified by Compustat. AVOL is the average of daily
actual less daily expected selling activity by individual investors scaled by the standard deviation of selling ac-
tivity, computed over days t − 1 to t + 1. Actual selling activity by individual investors is the natural logarithm
of one plus the number of trades classified as sell orders by individual investors and the expectation and
standard deviation of selling activity is the average and standard deviation, respectively, of the same selling
metric over the 50 trading dates immediately preceding day t − 1 (after excluding prior three-day earn-
ings announcement windows). RAT E is the maximum statutory short-term capital gains tax rate minus
the maximum statutory long-term capital gains tax rate on day t. ̄P is the volume-weighted, average price
change over the prior 248 trading days immediately preceding day t − 2 (within the requisite ITD holding
period), 1248
∑250
n=3 wn · Pt−n, where Pt−n is the logarithm of the stock price on day t − 2 (adjusted for
stock splits and stock dividends) minus the logarithm of the stock price on day t − n and wn is equal to the
daily volume on day t − n divided by the firm’s cumulative trading volume over the two years immediately
preceding the earnings announcement. ITD is equal to the product of RAT E and ̄P . INTENSITY is
100 times the variance of daily changes in the logarithm of stock price estimated over the 100 trading days
immediately preceding day t − 1. UE is 100 the times the difference between announced quarterly earnings
on day t and the median analyst forecast within the 60 days preceding day t − 1. BI D ASK is the average
percentage bid-ask spread over the 10 trading days immediately preceding day t − 1. SIZE is the market
value of equity (in billions) at the end of the fiscal quarter preceding day t. N U M E ST is the number of
analysts issuing a quarterly earnings forecast within 60 days prior to day t − 1.
activity to ITDs by decomposing the risk of future adverse price changes
into two components: the duration and the intensity of the risk. In sec-
tion 4.3, I test whether duration (i.e., the length of time that a risk must
be borne before an investor meets the ITD holding period requirement)
affects trading around quarterly earnings announcements. Finally, in sec-
tion 4.4, I investigate how the intensity of risk interacts with ITD incentives
to influence trading.
4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 1 presents the sample distribution of selected regression variables.
Abnormal selling activity by individual investors around quarterly earnings
announcements, AVOL, has a mean and standard deviation of 1.556 and
1.579, respectively, which are comparable to values reported in prior ITD
studies. The mean RATE is 0.116 and varies between 0.00 and 0.30 over
the sample period. The mean (median) market value of equity is $4.681
($1.013) billion and the mean (median) number of analysts following each
firm is 7.3 (6.0).
4.2 ITDS AND TRADING ACTIVITY
A necessary condition for risk to affect trading is that ITDs must
have a significant influence on investors’ trading decisions. As discussed
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earlier, Blouin, Raedy, and Shackelford [2003] and Hurtt and Seida [2004]
document empirical evidence consistent with this necessary condition
around quarterly earnings announcement dates, which provides prelimi-
nary support and serves as a benchmark for my tests. I test for this effect
in my sample and find supporting evidence that corroborates the findings
of prior studies. Testing the necessary condition is intended to provide a
foundation, and serve as a point of departure, for examining the main em-
pirical implications of my model: how the risk of adverse price change in-
fluences investors’ trading decisions around quarterly earnings announce-
ments given ITD incentives to postpone trade.
I employ the following OLS regression model to test for the necessary
condition:
AVOL = β0 + β1RATE + β2̄P + β3ITD + controls + ε, (3)
where a negative sign associated with β3 is predicted if ITD transaction
costs provide an incentive to investors to postpone trading. Table 2, col-
umn 1 presents the parameter estimates for this analysis, which is based on
the entire sample. As expected, I find that β3 is negative and statistically
significant.20 This result complements similar evidence documented by
Blouin, Raedy, and Shackelford [2003] and Hurtt and Seida [2004] and
provides preliminary evidence that trading activity is decreasing in ITD
transaction costs in my sample.
Is this result attributable to ITD effects? Investors are only taxed on real-
ized trading profits (i.e., only if an asset has appreciated in value) but do
not receive a direct ITD benefit (in the form of a tax subsidy) from the
sale of assets that have depreciated.21 Therefore, investors’ trading deci-
sions when the asset has depreciated in value should be much less sensitive
to ITD costs (i.e., the necessary condition may not be satisfied) compared
to an asset that has appreciated in value and will generate an ITD tax. The
asymmetric nature of tax incentives for appreciated versus depreciated as-
sets provides a discriminating prediction capable of providing additional
evidence attributable to an ITD effect. Specifically, I expect AVOL to exhibit
a negative association with ITD when the aggregate price change over the
prior holding period is greater than zero. Conversely, I expect to find no
such relationship among stocks that have not appreciated over the hold-
ing period. Following Blouin, Raedy, and Shackelford [2003], I separate
the sample into appreciated (i.e., ̄P > 0) and depreciated (i.e., ̄P ≤ 0)
observations and estimate equation (3) for each sample. If the results in col-
umn 1 are attributable to ITD incentives to postpone trading, then I expect
to find a negative sign on β3 for the appreciated sample and a β3 coefficient
20 Standard errors for all specifications account for clustering by the month of the earnings
announcement (see Petersen [2009]).
21 As discussed earlier, investors may receive an indirect ITD benefit if they are able to offset
a portion of a realized capital gain in an appreciated asset with a realized capital loss in another
asset.
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T A B L E 2








Variable Pred. Coeff. (t -stat) Coeff. (t -stat) Coeff. (t -stat)
RATE −0.828 (−5.17) 0.423 (2.00) −0.926 (−5.07)
̄P a 2.182 (6.94) 2.396 (11.86) 0.512 (1.15)
ITD a (–) −4.414 (−3.60) −5.709 (−3.35) −0.655 (−0.75)
AUEb 0.238 (8.05) 0.337 (10.10) 0.148 (6.35)
NONLINEARb −0.027 (−3.65) −0.039 (−4.36) −0.015 (−5.52)
BID ASK a −1.864 (−1.89) −2.389 (−4.20) 1.493 (1.02)
SIZE 0.112 (3.22) 0.064 (4.29) 0.164 (6.34)
NUM EST 0.019 (2.60) 0.020 (2.50) 0.016 (2.29)
Adj. R2 0.4058 0.4388 0.4303
Num. Obs. 35,222 22,360 12,862
aVariable winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
bVariable winsorized at the 99% level.
Let t denote the quarterly earnings announcement date identified by Compustat. The dependent vari-
able is the three-day abnormal selling activity by individual investors, AVOL, around quarterly earnings an-
nouncements from 1982 to 2002. Specifically, AVOL is the average of daily actual less daily expected selling
activity by individual investors scaled by the standard deviation of selling activity, computed over days t − 1
to t + 1. Actual selling activity by individual investors is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of
trades classified as sell orders by individual investors and the expectation and standard deviation of selling
activity is the average and standard deviation, respectively, of the same selling metric over the 50 trading
dates immediately preceding day t − 1 (after excluding prior three-day earnings announcement windows).
RATE is the maximum statutory short-term capital gains tax rate minus the maximum statutory long-term
capital gains tax rate on day t . ̄P is the volume-weighted, average price change over the prior 248 trad-
ing days immediately preceding day t − 2 (within the requisite ITD holding period), 1248
∑250
n=3 wn · Pt−n,
where Pt−n is the logarithm of the stock price on day t − 2 (adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends)
minus the logarithm of the stock price on day t − n and wn is equal to the daily volume on day t − n divided
by the firm’s cumulative trading volume over the two years immediately preceding the earnings announce-
ment. ITD is equal to the product of RATE and ̄P . AUE is 100 the times absolute value of the difference
between announced quarterly earnings on day t and the median analyst forecast within the 60 days preced-
ing day t − 1. NONLINEAR is equal to the square of AUE . BID ASK is the average percentage bid-ask spread
over the 10 trading days immediately preceding day t − 1. SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of
equity at the end of the fiscal quarter preceding day t . NUM EST is the logarithm of the number of analysts
issuing a quarterly earnings forecast within 60 days prior to day t − 1. Firm fixed-effects are included and
coefficient t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by the month of the earnings announcement.
for the depreciated sample that is smaller in magnitude and not statistically
different from zero. Table 2, columns 2 and 3 present results for the appre-
ciated and depreciated samples, respectively. Consistent with a tax-related
explanation, I find that β3 for the appreciated sample is negative and sig-
nificant (column 2), while β3 for the depreciated sample is slightly negative
but not statistically significant (column 3).22
The empirical results of this section provide evidence that investors’ trad-
ing decisions around quarterly earnings announcements are sensitive to
22 At a given point in time, many investors will have already held their shares for longer than
the requisite ITD holding period and, therefore, should not be sensitive to ITD transaction
costs. In untabulated analyses, I include the stock price appreciation for days t − 249 to t − 498
and the interaction with RATE . Both variables are not statistically different from zero in all
specifications.
48 R. T. BALL
ITD incentives to postpone trade. The results presented in table 2 provide
evidence that the necessary condition of my model is satisfied and pro-
vides a foundation for testing the two main empirical implications of the
model.
4.3 THE IMPACT OF THE DURATION OF RISK ON ITDS AND TRADING ACTIVITY
This section tests empirical implication 1, which states that as duration
(i.e., the amount of time remaining in the requisite ITD holding period)
increases, investors’ trading decisions become less sensitive to ITD costs.
This occurs because investors who do not trade now must bear the risk of
adverse price changes until the end of the requisite holding period. As this
length of time increases (i.e., the longer the investor must bear such risk),
the more willing they are to incur the ITD cost by prematurely trading to
avoid the higher risk of adverse price changes. I refer to this effect as the
duration of risk.
The average ITD measure, used in the prior section, equally weights each
day’s price appreciation across all holding periods. Thus, the β3 coefficient
in (3) only measures the average ITD incentive among investors and is not
capable of discriminating among the different risk-sharing incentives of in-
vestors with different amounts of time remaining until qualification.
To empirically test this prediction, I disaggregate the price change, ̄P ,
and ITD variables in (3) into the 248 individual holding period compo-
nents and include each as a separate explanatory variable. In other words,
instead of one aggregate ITD variable, I now include 248 ITD variables,
one for each day in the requisite holding period. This allows me to esti-
mate a separate ITD coefficient for investors with different duration of risk
incentives. For example, I include the price change, and corresponding
ITD incentive, over the prior 248 days (day t − 250 to t − 2) as a separate
explanatory variable that represents investors that have exactly one day re-
maining in their ITD requisite holding period. Within the same regression
model, I also include the price change and ITD incentive of an investor
that purchased shares five days prior to the earnings announcement and
has 245 days remaining in their ITD requisite holding period. If investors
consider the duration of risk when trading, then I expect the ITD incentive
of the investor with one day remaining, ITD1, to have a more negative co-
efficient than the ITD incentive of the investor with 245 days left, ITD245.
This follows as investors with a longer amount of time remaining in their
ITD holding period are more willing to incur the higher ITD costs by pre-
maturely trading in an effort to avoid having to face adverse price risk over
a long duration of time.





βP (d) · Pd +
248∑
d=1
βI TD(d) · ITDd + controls + ε, (4)
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where Pd = ln(Pt−2) − ln(Pt−(250−d)) ≡ ln(Pt−2) − ln(Pt−n), ITDd =
RATE · Pd . The estimated parameters, βI TD(d), in the model reflect
the sensitivity of trading activity to the ITD transaction cost for an investor
with a given duration, d, of risk. Based on the empirical predictions of
section 2.3, βI TD(d) is expected to be an increasing function of the duration
of risk, d (i.e., βI TD(1) < βI TD(2) < · · · < βI TD(247) < βI TD(248) < 0).
To test this prediction, I restrict each of the 248 βI TD(d) estimates (and
their main effects, βP (d)) so they follow a linear function of duration,
d. Specifically, the regression in (4) is estimated subject to the following
coefficient restrictions:
βP (d) = α0 + α1 · d, (5)
βI TD(d) = γ0 + γ1 · d, (6)
where α0, α1, γ0 and γ1 are estimated parameters that summarize the co-
efficient dynamics as a function of duration, d.23,24 Specifically, γ0 is an
estimate of the sensitivity of trading activity to the ITD transaction cost for
an investor with a very small duration of risk, which is expected to be neg-
ative. The parameter γ1 is an estimate of the change in the sensitivity of
trading activity to ITD transaction costs as the duration of risk, d, increases.
It is expected to be positive, which is consistent with the investors placing
less weight on ITD transaction costs (i.e., less negative association) as the
duration of risk, d, that they must bear increases.25
23 Placing restrictions on the dynamics of the individual coefficients is similar in spirit
to traditional distributed lag models (e.g., Gonedes [1971], Falk and Miller [1977],
Sougiannis [1994]) and mixed data sampling models (e.g., Ghysels, Santa-Clara, and
Valkanov [2006], Ghysels, Sinko, and Valkanov [2007]).
24 Estimating (4) subject to (6) and (7) is equivalent to estimating the following
OLS regression: AVOL = α0 ·
∑248
d=1 Pd + α1 ·
∑248
d=1 d · Pd + γ0 ·
∑248
d=1 ITDd + γ1 ·
∑248
d=1 d ·
ITDd + controls + ε.
25 In addition to succinctly summarizing the dynamics of the coefficient estimates, the
restrictions imposed by (6) and (7) reduce two other difficulties associated with a reason-
able estimation of (7). First, adding the individual price changes and ITD incentives from
the prior year requires the estimation of 496 additional coefficients, which significantly re-
duces the degrees of freedom. Second, many of the holding period price changes, Pd ,
are estimated across overlapping time periods, which introduces potential multicollinear-
ity problems among the explanatory variables. For example, the price change of an in-
vestor with a duration of one day represents a cumulative 248-day price change. Simi-
larly, within the same observation, an investor with a duration of two days has a 247-day
price change. Both price changes share 247 daily price changes, which means they will
be highly correlated. When severe multicollinearity exists, it becomes very difficult to pre-
cisely identify the separate effects among the explanatory variables. As a consequence, coef-
ficient estimates will exhibit large sampling variances (see Judge et al. [1985]). This prob-
lem is further compounded by the inclusion of the remaining 246 price change variables,
as well as 248 highly correlated ITDd variables. Restricting the individual coefficients to
a small-dimension parameter space, as in (6) and (7), injects additional information into
the regression through the parameterizing function, which imposes a large number of
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T A B L E 3
Regression Examining the Duration of Risk and Selling Activity by Individual Investors Around
Quarterly Earnings Announcements
Dependent Variable: AVOL
Parameters Pred. Coeff. (t -stat) Parameters Coeff. (t-stat)
ITDd γ0 (–) −12.895 (−4.19) RATE −0.815 (−4.97)
γ1 (+) 0.057 (3.07) AUEb 0.231 (8.24)
NONLINEARb −0.027 (−3.17)
P d α0 −1.726 (−2.75) BID ASK a −1.187 (−1.83)
α1 0.040 (6.04) SIZE 0.118 (3.54)
NUM EST 0.018 (2.70)
Adj. R 2 = 0.4088
Num. Obs. = 35,222
aVariable winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
bVariable winsorized at the 99% level.




βP (d) · Pd +
248∑
d=1
βITD(d) · I TDd + controls + ε,
subject to: βP (d) = α0 + α1 · d,
βITD(d) = γ0 + γ1 · d.
Let t denote the quarterly earnings announcement date identified by Compustat. The dependent
variable is the three-day abnormal selling activity by individual investors, AVOL, around 35,222 quarterly
earnings announcements from 1982 to 2002. Specifically, AVOL is the average of daily actual less daily
expected selling activity by individual investors scaled by the standard deviation of selling activity, computed
over days t − 1 to t + 1. Actual selling activity by individual investors is the natural logarithm of one plus
the number of trades classified as sell orders by individual investors and the expectation and standard
deviation of selling activity is the average and standard deviation, respectively, of the same selling metric
over the 50 trading dates immediately preceding day t − 1 (after excluding prior three-day earnings
announcement windows). Pt−n is equal to the logarithm of the stock price on day t − 2 (adjusted for
stock splits and stock dividends) minus the logarithm of the stock price on day t − n scaled by 248 and
weighted by the ratio of the firm’s daily volume on day t − n to the total trading volume over the two years
immediately preceding the earnings announcement. ITDd is equal to the product of RATE and Pd ,
where RATE is the maximum statutory short-term capital gains tax rate minus the maximum statutory
long-term capital gains tax rate on day t . Duration, d, is the number of trading days from the quarterly
earnings announcement date, t , that an investor that purchased shares on day t − n must hold the stock to
meet the requisite ITD holding period of 250 trading days. Other controls (defined in section 3.2) include
AUE , NONLINEAR , SIZE , and NUM EST . Firm fixed-effects are included and coefficient t-statistics are
based on standard errors clustered by the month of the earnings announcement.
Table 3 presents parameter estimates from (4) subject to (5) and (6).
Consistent with my empirical predictions, I find that γ0 is negative and sta-
tistically significant, and γ1 is positive and statistically significant. This im-
plies that the negative relationship between AVOL and ITDd is increasing
(i.e., becoming less negative) as the duration, d, of time investors must bear
risk increases.
Specifically, the sensitivity of investors’ trading decisions to ITD costs is
increasing (i.e., becoming less negative) in duration. This is consistent with
the notion that, all else being equal, when investors face more uncertainty
coefficient constraints. This reduces the sampling variability of coefficient estimates and
counteracts increased variability from multicollinearity (see Judge et al. [1985], Kennedy
[2003]).
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in the future (i.e., have a longer time to wait), postponing trade becomes
more costly from a risk perspective, and thus the ITD incentive to postpone
trading becomes relatively less important than the risk-related incentive to
trade immediately.
The economic significance of the duration of risk on the sensitivity of
trade to ITD costs is evident from the parameter estimates in table 3. For
example, this sensitivity is highest (and statistically significant) for investors
with the shortest duration of risk (i.e., βI TD(1) = γ0 + γ1(1) = −12.838),
while the sensitivity of investors with the highest duration of risk is negli-
gible (i.e., βI TD(250) = γ0 + γ1(250) = 1.355) and not statistically different
from zero. Thus, an increase in the duration of risk from 1 to 250 completely
eliminates any ITD tax incentive to postpone trade because it imposes too
high of an implicit cost on risk averse investors. Again, this result is con-
sistent with the Hirshleifer Effect and highlights the important economic
costs associated with anticipated information.
4.4 THE IMPACT OF THE INTENSITY OF RISK ON ITDS AND TRADING ACTIVITY
This section tests empirical implication 2, which states that, as the intensity
of price fluctuations per unit of time increases, investors’ trading decisions
become less sensitive to ITD costs. Holding duration of risk and the ITD
incentive to postpone trading constant, stocks with a higher expected daily
return volatility pose a greater risk of adverse future price changes than do
lower volatility stocks. I refer to this effect as the intensity of risk.
To test this prediction, I estimate the regression specified in (4) but alter
the coefficient restrictions, (5) and (6), as follows:
βP (d) = α0 + α1 · d + αint · INTENSITY , (7)
βI TD(d) = γ0 + γ1 · d + γint · INTENSITY , (8)
where a positive γint is consistent with empirical implication 2 and INTEN-
SITY is expressed as a sample rank.26
Table 4 presents the parameter estimates from (4), subject to (7) and
(8). Consistent with my empirical predictions, I find that the coefficient
γint is positive and statistically significant, which signifies that the function
describing βI TD(d) shifts upward as INTENSITY increases. This implies that
investors’ trading decisions become less sensitive to ITD costs as postponing
trade becomes more costly from a risk perspective. Therefore, investors are
more likely to pay the higher ITD cost to shed the risk of intense price
26 In the conceptual framework outlined in section 2, trading volume is a function of the
variance, and not of the standard deviation, of anticipated stock prices. However, this is an
artifact of the stylized nature of the model’s assumptions and there is no reason to believe that
investors do not consider the standard deviation instead of the variance. In order to avoid any
non-linear differences between the two measures, I use sample percentile ranks because both
the standard deviation and variance will have exactly the same rank order. All other measures
of INTENSITY I consider in the section are expressed as a sample percentile rank.
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T A B L E 4
Regression Examining the Intensity of Risk and Selling Activity by Individual Investors Around
Quarterly Earnings Announcements
Dependent Variable: AVOL
Parameters Pred. Coeff. (t -stat) Parameters Coeff. (t -stat)
ITDd γ0 (–) −11.048 (−2.55) RATE −0.987 (−5.46)
γ1 (+) 0.039 (4.14) AUEb 0.246 (8.54)
γint (+) 2.848 (2.03) NONLINEARb −0.028 (−3.38)
BID ASK a −2.190 (−2.15)
P d α0 −1.971 (−3.03) SIZE 0.126 (3.85)
α1 0.044 (6.50) NUM EST 0.019 (2.85)
αint −0.371 (−1.85) INTENSITY −0.328 (−3.32)
Adj. R2 = 0.4120
Num. Obs. = 35,222
aVariable winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
b Variable winsorized at the 99% level.




βP (θ) · Pd +
248∑
d=1
βI TD(θ) · I TDd + controls + ε,
subject to: βP (θ) = α0 + α1 · d + αint · INTENSITY ,
βI TD(θ) = γ0 + γ1 · d + γint · INTENSITY ,
where θ ∈ {d, INTENSITY }. Let t denote the quarterly earnings announcement date identified by
Compustat. The dependent variable is the three-day abnormal selling activity by individual investors, AVOL,
around 35,222 quarterly earnings announcements from 1982 to 2002. Specifically, AVOL is the average
of daily actual less daily expected selling activity by individual investors scaled by the standard deviation
of selling activity, computed over days t − 1 to t + 1. Actual selling activity by individual investors is the
natural logarithm of one plus the number of trades classified as sell orders by individual investors and the
expectation and standard deviation of selling activity is the average and standard deviation, respectively, of
the same selling metric over the 50 trading dates immediately preceding day t − 1 (after excluding prior
three-day earnings announcement windows). Pt−n is equal to the logarithm of the stock price on day t − 2
(adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends) minus the logarithm of the stock price on day t − n scaled
by 248 and weighted by the ratio of the firm’s daily volume on day t − n to the total trading volume over
the two years immediately preceding the earnings announcement. ITDd is equal to the product of RATE
and Pd , where RATE is the maximum statutory short-term capital gains tax rate minus the maximum
statutory long-term capital gains tax rate on day t. Duration, d, is the number of trading days from the
quarterly earnings announcement date, t , that an investor, which purchased shares on day t − n, must hold
the stock to meet the requisite ITD holding period of 250 trading days. INTENSITY is the variance of daily
changes in the logarithm of stock price estimated over the 100 trading days immediately preceding day
t − 1 expressed as a fractional rank within the sample (high fractional rank corresponds to high variance).
Other controls (defined in section 3.2) include AUE , NONLINEAR , SIZE , and NUM EST . Firm fixed-effects
are included and coefficient t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by the month of the earnings
announcement.
movements, holding duration constant. In addition, the coefficients γ0 and
γ1 associated with duration are similar to the values reported in table 3. All
other control variables exhibit similar values to those reported in previous
specifications.
This result highlights the important role of the intensity of risk on the
sensitivity of trading to ITD costs. However, while the results are sta-
tistically significant, the economic magnitude is less pronounced com-
pared to the duration of risk results discussed previously. For exam-
ple, consider the sensitivity of an investor with the shortest duration
(i.e., d = 1) of risk. Moving from the lowest to highest intensity of risk
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(i.e, INTENSITY = 0 to INTENSITY = 1) reduces the magnitude of the
sensitivity by γint = 2.848, which reflects a decrease of approximately 25.7%
relative to the benchmark sensitivity of γ0 = −11.048. This implies that for
every $100 risk-averse investors postpone trading in a stock with low inten-
sity of risk in order to avoid paying any ITD taxes, they are willing to pay
$5.04 in additional taxes on immediate trade for a stock with high intensity
of risk when the difference between the long-term and short-term tax rates,
RATE , is 19.6%.27 Thus, varying the intensity of risk from one extreme
to the other does have a substantial economic impact on the sensitivity of
trade to ITD costs, but reflects only one fourth of the economic impact of
the duration of risk.
Recall from the analysis in section 4.2 that investors may have asymmetric
ITD incentives depending on whether the price has appreciated or depre-
ciated over the prior holding period. The specifications in tables 3 and 4
do not account for such differences in appreciated and depreciated prices
and, therefore, in differences in ITD incentives to postpone trading. A po-
tential solution is to partition the sample based on whether the stock has
an average appreciation or an average depreciation over the prior hold-
ing period (see section 4.2 and results in table 2, columns 2 and 3). How-
ever, even if the average investor holding a stock has an appreciated ba-
sis, some investors holding the same stock will have a depreciated basis
(as purchase prices vary over the prior holding period) and, therefore,
different ITD incentives from an investor with an appreciated basis. Clas-
sifying observations based on the average amount of price appreciation
destroys information about asymmetric ITD costs across different holding
periods within the same observation. I allow appreciated holding periods
to follow different functions describing βP (d) and βI TD(d) from those
of depreciated holding periods. Specifically, (7) and (8) are adjusted as
follows:
βP (θ) = APPd ·
(








βI TD(θ) = APPd ·
(








where θ ∈ {d, INTENSITY , APPd , DEPd}. APPd is an indicator variable
equal to one if the change in stock price for an investor with duration
d is positive (i.e., Pd > 0), and equal to zero otherwise. DEPd is an
indicator variable equal to one if the change in stock price for an in-
vestor with duration d is not positive (i.e., Pd ≤ 0) and equal to zero
otherwise. If investors have asymmetric ITD incentives with respect to
appreciated and depreciated holding periods, then I expect the previous
27 This value is computed as $100 × 0.196 × 0.257 = $5.04.
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Regression Examining the Intensity of Risk and Selling Activity by Individual Investors Around
Quarterly Earnings Announcements for Appreciated and Depreciated Holding Periods
Dependent Variable: AVOL
Parameters Pred. Coeff. (t -stat) Parameters Coeff. (t -stat)
ITDd · APP d γ A0 (–) −18.965 (−2.29) ITDd · DEP d γ D0 1.305 (0.59)
γ A1 (+) 0.062 (3.61) γ
D
1 0.014 (0.73)
αAint (+) 7.543 (3.18) γ
D
int 1.583 (0.12)
Adjusted R 2 = 0.4235
Num. Obs. = 35,222




βP (θ) · Pd +
248∑
d=1
βI TD(θ) · I TDd + controls + ε,
subject to: βP (θ) = APPd ·
(
αA0 + αA1 · d + αAint · INTENSITY
) + DEPd · (αD0 + αD1 · d + αDint · INTENSITY ) ,
βI TD(θ) = APPd ·
(
γ A0 + γ A1 · d + γ Aint · INTENSITY
) + DEPd · (γ D0 + γ D1 · d + γ Dint · INTENSITY )
where θ ∈ {d, INTENSITY , APPd , DEPd }. The dependent variable is the three-day abnormal selling activity
by individual investors, AVOL (defined in section 3.2), around 35,222 quarterly earnings announcements
from 1982 to 2002. Pt−n is equal to the logarithm of the stock price on day t − 2 (adjusted for stock splits
and stock dividends) minus the logarithm of the stock price on day t − n scaled by 248 and weighted by the
ratio of the firm’s daily volume on day t − n to the total trading volume over the two years immediately pre-
ceding the earnings announcement. ITDd is equal to the product of RATE and Pd , where RATE is the
maximum statutory short-term capital gains tax rate minus the maximum statutory long-term capital gains
tax rate on day t. Duration, d, is the number of trading days from the quarterly earnings announcement
date, t , that an investor that purchased shares on day t − n must hold the stock to meet the requisite ITD
holding period of 250 trading days. INTENSITY is the variance of daily changes in the logarithm of stock
price estimated over the 100 trading days immediately preceding day t − 1 expressed as a fractional rank
within the sample (high fractional rank corresponds to high variance). APPd is an indicator variable equal
to one if the change in stock price for an investor with duration, d, is positive (i.e., Pd > 0) and equal
to zero otherwise. DEPd is an indicator variable equal to one if the change in stock price for an investor
with duration, d, is not positive (i.e., Pd ≤ 0) and equal to zero otherwise. Other controls (defined in sec-
tion 3.2) include AUE , NONLINEAR , SIZE , and NUM EST . Firm fixed-effects are included and coefficient
t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by the month of the earnings announcement.
results for βI TD(θ) to reflect the influence of appreciated days (i.e., γ Aθ co-
efficients are statistically significant with the predicted sign) rather than
the influence of depreciated days (i.e., γ Dθ coefficients are not statistically
significant).
Table 5 presents the parameter estimates associated with βI TD(θ) from
(4), subject to (9) and (10). Consistent with an expected asymmetric ITD
incentive between appreciated and depreciated price changes, I find that
the coefficient estimates associated with appreciated holding periods (i.e.,
γ Aθ ) have the predicted sign and are statistically significant. In particular,
the coefficient γ Aint is positive and statistically significant with a higher mag-
nitude than the value reported in table 4. By contrast, the estimates asso-
ciated with depreciated holding periods (i.e., γ Dθ ) do not consistently have
the predicted sign and are not statistically significant.
In addition to variance of the daily stock return distribution, I also con-
sider three other proxies for the intensity component of risk: (1) the id-
iosyncratic variance of daily returns, (2) the systematic (market and two-
digit industry) variance of daily returns, and (3) the coefficient of skewness
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of the daily return distribution. First, I examine whether the INTENSITY
results in tables 4 and 5 are driven by idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk, or
both by decomposing the total return variance, INTENSITY , into the id-
iosyncratic variance, IDIO, and the systematic variance, SYST . Specifically,
IDIO and SYST are equal to the variance of the residual and predicted val-
ues (expressed as a sample percentile rank), respectively, from a regression
of firm-specific returns on the CRSP value-weighted market return and the
two-digit industry return (e.g., see Roll [1988]) estimated over the 100 trad-
ing days immediately preceding day t − 1, where t is the quarterly earnings
announcement date. Results for this specification are presented in table 6,
column 1. I find that γ Aidio is positive and statistically significant, while γ
A
syst
is positive but not statistically significant. These results indicate that, if in-
vestors attempt to hedge their risks (e.g., by short-selling similar assets), it
may be difficult to find a substitute asset to hedge the idiosyncratic risk of
adverse price changes while waiting for the ITD holding period to expire
without triggering an immediate capital gain tax. Conversely, systematic risk
does not significantly influence the sensitivity of investors’ trading decisions
to ITD costs.
Second, I examine the degree to which a firm’s stock is “crash prone”
by examining the degree of left-skewness in the daily return distribu-
tion. Specifically, I define SKEW as the negative coefficient of skewness
(expressed as a sample rank) of the firm-specific daily price change
distribution, estimated over the 100 trading days immediately preceding
day t − 1. Following Chen, Hong, and Stein [2001], I compute SKEW as
follows:
SKEW = − 100 · 99
3/2 · ∑101n=2 R3t−n
99 · 98 · (∑101n=2 R2t−n)3/2 ,
where Rt−n is the logarithm of the daily change in stock price on day t − n.
Placing a minus sign on the coefficient of skewness adopts the convention
that a higher value of SKEW corresponds to a higher risk of a stock price
“crash.” Table 6, column 2 presents results for the specification in which
INTENSITY is replaced with SKEW . Consistent with the INTENSITY results
from table 5, I find that γ Askew is positive and statistically significant, which is
consistent with a decrease in the sensitivity of investors’ trading decisions to
ITD costs as the probability of a large stock price “crash” (i.e., high SKEW )
increases.
Finally, prior research documents a positive correlation between stock
price volatility and the degree of institutional ownership in a firm (e.g.,
Potter [1992], Sias [1996]). Many institutions are exempt from paying cap-
ital gains taxes, leaving them with no ITD incentive to postpone trading.
Because INTENSITY is based on the stock price volatility, it may simply
serve as a proxy for the degree of institutional ownership and, therefore,
capture the average tax status among traders at the quarterly earnings
announcement date, rather than the risk of adverse price changes that
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Parameters Coeff. (t -stat) Coeff. (t -stat) Coeff. (t -stat)
ITDd · APP d γ A0 −17.415 (−2.88) −18.287 (−2.41) −17.299 (−2.25)
γ A1 0.058 (3.71) 0.057 (3.14) 0.058 (3.37)
γ Aidio 8.365 (3.17) 7.314 (3.08)
γ Asyst 1.024 (0.27) −0.271 (−0.89)
γ Askew 5.886 (3.64)
γ Ainst −0.122 (−0.40)




βP (θ) · Pd +
248∑
d=1
βI TD(θ) · I TDd + controls + ε,
subject to: βP (θ) = APPd ·
(




αD0 + αD1 · d + αDidio · IDIO + αDsyst · SYST + αDskew · SKEW + αDinst · INST
)
,
βI TD(θ) = APPd ·
(




γ D0 + γ D1 · d + γ Didio · IDIO + γ Dsyst · SYST + γ Dskew · SKEW + γ Dinst · INST
)
,
where θ ∈ {d, IDIO, SYST , SKEW , INST , APPd , DEPd }. The dependent variable is the three-day abnormal
selling activity by individual investors, AVOL (defined in section 3.2), around 35,222 quarterly earnings
announcements from 1982 to 2002. Pt−n is equal to the logarithm of the stock price on day t − 2 (adjusted
for stock splits and stock dividends) minus the logarithm of the stock price on day t − n scaled by 248 and
weighted by the ratio of the firm’s daily volume on day t − n to the total trading volume over the two years
immediately preceding the earnings announcement. ITDd is equal to the product of RATE and Pd ,
where RATE is the maximum statutory short-term capital gains tax rate minus the maximum statutory
long-term capital gains tax rate on day t. Duration, d, is the number of trading days from the quarterly
earnings announcement date, t , that an investor that purchased shares on day t − n must hold the stock to
meet the requisite ITD holding period of 250 trading days. INTENSITY is the variance of daily changes in
the logarithm of stock price estimated over the 100 trading days immediately preceding day t − 1 expressed
as a fractional rank within the sample (high fractional rank corresponds to high variance). IDIO (SYST) is
the residual (predicted) variance, expressed as a fractional rank, from a regression of firm-specific excess
returns on the excess market return and the excess two-digit industry return estimated over the 100 trading
days immediately preceding day t − 1. SKEW , expressed as a fractional rank, is the negative coefficient
of skewness of the firm-specific daily return distribution estimated over the 100 trading days immediately
preceding day t − 1. INST , expressed as a fractional rank, is the percentage of shares held by a 13-F filing
institution at the end of the calendar quarter immediately preceding the earnings announcement date, t .
APPd is an indicator variable equal to one if the change in stock price for an investor with duration, d, is
positive(i.e., Pd > 0) and equal to zero otherwise. DEPd is an indicator variable equal to one if the change
in stock price for an investor with duration, d, is not positive (i.e., Pd ≤ 0) and equal to zero otherwise.
Other controls (defined in section 3.2) include AUE , NONLINEAR , SIZE , and NUM EST . Firm fixed-effects
are included and coefficient t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by the month of the earnings
announcement.
investors subject to an ITD may consider. I examine this possibility by com-
puting the fraction of a firm’s stock owned by institutional investors to test if
it eliminates the statistical significance or changes the sign of γ Aidio in table 6,
column 1. Specifically, I include the percentage of shares held by 13-F filing
institutions, INST (expressed as a sample rank), computed at the end of the
calendar quarter immediately preceding the earnings announcement date.
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The results in table 6, column 3 show that γ Aidio remains positive and statis-
tically significant, while γ Ainst is negative and not statistically significant. The
lack of significance associated with γ Ainst is consistent with the empirical evi-
dence in Blouin, Raedy, and Shackelford [2003] illustrating that the degree
of institutional ownership does not provide a discriminating ITD result for
their sample. This indicates that INST may be a poor proxy for the true
(unobservable) tax status of traders around an earnings announcement.
Consequently, I cannot rule out the possibility that INTENSITY is simply a
proxy for the fraction of investors that are subject to an ITD cost.
4.5 THE IMPACT OF INVESTOR RISK AVERSION
Investor risk aversion plays a critical role in the Hirshleifer Effect, which
distinguishes it from alternative explanations for the observed relation
among trading volume, ITD incentives, and the risk of future adverse price
changes. In particular, Constantinides [1984] explicitly links stock return
volatility to optimal trading decisions based on investors’ option to real-
ize losses short-term and gains long-term for tax purposes. In that study,
the relation among trading volume, ITD incentives, and risk of future ad-
verse price changes is unrelated to the Hirshleifer Effect because it does
not rely on investor risk aversion. Thus, in this section I test whether the
documented ITD/risk tradeoff varies as a function of investor risk aversion
in order to distinguish it from the alternative timing option mechanism
proposed by Constantinides [1984].
I compute an investor risk aversion index following Bollerslev, Gibson,
and Zhou [2011]. This risk aversion index is calculated for each month
between 1990 to 2002 and relies on sample moments of the model-free
realized and option-implied (i.e., VIX) volatilities on the S&P 500 index. In
order to capture differential risk aversion that is orthogonal to investor’s tax
incentives, I first group observations based on their difference between the
long-term and short-term tax rates (RATE). Within each RATE group,
I then partition observations into above and below median (i.e., high and
low) risk aversion index values. Finally, I separately estimate (4), subject to
(9) and (10), for the high and low risk aversion subsamples.
Table 7 presents the parameter estimates associated with βI TD(θ) for
the high risk aversion subsample (column 1), the low risk aversion sub-
sample (column 2) and the difference between them (column 3). I find
that the coefficient estimates associated with appreciated holding periods
have the predicted sign and are statistically significant for the high risk-
aversion subsample (column 1). In particular, the coefficient γ Aint is pos-
itive and statistically significant in the high risk aversion subsample and
is higher in magnitude than the value reported for the low risk aversion
subsample. The difference is statistically significant and indicates that an
increase in risk aversion increases the effect of risk intensity on the sensi-
tivity of investor’s trading decision to ITD incentives, which is expected if
the results are driven by the Hirshleifer Effect. Similarly, the coefficient γ A1 ,
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Regression Examining the Duration and Intensity of Risk and Selling Activity by Individual Investors
Around Quarterly Earnings Announcements Partitioned into Time Periods of High and Low Investor
Risk Aversion
Investor Risk Aversion
High Low High – Low
Parameters Coeff. (t -stat) Coeff. (t -stat) Coeff. (t -stat)
ITDd · APP d γ A0 −24.035 (−3.78) −8.106 (−2.61) −15.929 (−2.03)
γ A1 0.115 (2.97) 0.030 (0.88) 0.085 (2.01)
γ Aint 9.677 (2.94) 2.256 (0.57) 7.421 (2.24)




βP (θ) · Pd +
248∑
d=1
βI TD(θ) · I TDd + controls + ε,
subject to: βP (θ) = APPd · (αA0 + αA1 · d + αAint · INTENSITY ) + DEPd · (αD0 + αD1 · d + αDint · INTENSITY ),
βI TD(θ) = APPd · (γ A0 + γ A1 · d + γ Aint · INTENSITY ) + DEPd · (γ D0 + γ D1 · d + γ Dint · INTENSITY )
where θ ∈ {d, INTENSITY , APPd , DEPd }. The dependent variable is the three-day abnormal selling activity
by individual investors, AVOL (defined in section 3.2), around 24,557 quarterly earnings announcements
from 1990 to 2002. Pt−n is equal to the logarithm of the stock price on day t − 2 (adjusted for stock splits
and stock dividends) minus the logarithm of the stock price on day t − n scaled by 248 and weighted by the
ratio of the firm’s daily volume on day t − n to the total trading volume over the two years immediately pre-
ceding the earnings announcement. ITDd is equal to the product of RATE and Pd , where RATE is the
maximum statutory short-term capital gains tax rate minus the maximum statutory long-term capital gains
tax rate on day t. Duration, d, is the number of trading days from the quarterly earnings announcement
date, t , that an investor that purchased shares on day t − n must hold the stock to meet the requisite ITD
holding period of 250 trading days. INTENSITY is the variance of daily changes in the logarithm of stock
price estimated over the 100 trading days immediately preceding day t − 1 expressed as a fractional rank
within the sample (high fractional rank corresponds to high variance). APPd is an indicator variable equal
to one if the change in stock price for an investor with duration, d, is positive (i.e., Pd > 0) and equal
to zero otherwise. DEPd is an indicator variable equal to one if the change in stock price for an investor
with duration, d, is not positive (i.e., Pd ≤ 0) and equal to zero otherwise. Other controls (defined in sec-
tion 3.2) include AUE , NONLINEAR , SIZE , and NUM EST . Firm fixed-effects are included and coefficient
t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by the month of the earnings announcement. The first
(second) column presents results for the subsample of observations with above (below) median investor
risk aversion. The third column presents the difference between the first and second columns.
capturing the duration of risk, is positive and statistically significant in the
high risk aversion subsample, which is higher in magnitude and statistically
different from the value reported for the low risk aversion subsample and
is consistent with the Hirshleifer Effect.
5. Conclusions
This paper theoretically and empirically investigates how the risk of fu-
ture adverse price changes created by the anticipated arrival of informa-
tion influences risk-averse investors’ trading decisions in institutionally im-
perfect capital markets, which is commonly referred to as the Hirshleifer
Effect (Hirshleifer [1971]). I examine the relation between trading activity
and the risk of adverse price changes, as measured by stock price volatil-
ity, in the presence of trading frictions created by the existence of ITDs.
An ITD refers to the incremental capital gains tax rate applied to trading
profits on shares held for less than a requisite amount of time. Specifically,
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I examine how trading activity is influenced by the tradeoff between the
risk-sharing benefits of immediate trade to mitigate exposure to future
adverse price changes, and explicit transaction costs imposed upon such
trades by the existence of an ITD.
Employing a stylized model, I demonstrate that current trading decisions
depend upon two aspects of risk: the intensity of expected future price fluc-
tuations per unit of time and the duration of time that risk must be borne.
Tension in the model is created by introducing an incremental capital gains
tax rate applied to trading profits on shares held for less than a requisite
amount of time. Thus, risk-averse investors face an economic tension be-
tween trading immediately to an optimal risk-sharing portfolio at the cost
of incurring an incremental tax on realized trading profits, versus postpon-
ing trade to avoid the incremental tax while facing the risk of interim, ad-
verse price changes. Specifically, I find that the total amount of risk that
each investor considers is an increasing function of both the intensity and
the duration of the risk of adverse price changes. Intuitively, intensity cap-
tures the risk of adverse price movements per unit of time, while duration
captures the amount of time that such risk must be held. The fact that in-
vestors can reduce tax costs by postponing the sale of shares until a known
future point in time creates a unique opportunity to empirically test the
Hirshleifer Effect.
I empirically examine whether the duration and intensity components of
risk affect the sensitivity of abnormal trading activity by individual investors
around quarterly earnings announcements to ITD transaction costs. Con-
sistent with the model’s predictions, I document evidence that, as the num-
ber of days left to avoid the incremental tax increases (i.e., duration of the
risk increases), abnormal trading activity becomes less sensitive to the in-
cremental transaction costs created by an ITD. Similarly, I find evidence
that, as the expected volatility of future stock price increases (i.e., intensity
of the risk increases), abnormal trading activity becomes less sensitive to
ITD transaction costs. These results suggest that investors are more willing
to incur explicit tax costs in order to insulate themselves against increases
in the risk of price fluctuations driven by increases in the duration and in-
tensity components of the risk. Overall, my analysis provides a novel and
powerful setting in which to directly examine empirical implications of the
adverse risk-sharing effect of anticipated information (i.e., the Hirshleifer
Effect).
APPENDIX
SHACKELFORD AND VERRECCHIA (2002)—EXTENSION
The following analysis is a multiperiod extension of Shackelford and Ver-
recchia [2002], which employs a stylized model of pure exchange popu-
lated by risk-averse investors with homogenous risk preferences. Investors
are endowed with shares of a risky asset and a risk-free bond in pe-
riod 0, trade shares of both in periods 1 and 2, and consume wealth in
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period 3. One share of the bond (the numeraire commodity) pays one unit
of consumption in period 3, while the payoff from a share of the risky asset
is a random variable, ũ. The per-capita supply of the risky asset, x, is com-
mon knowledge among investors and remains fixed across all time periods.
In period 0, there are two distinct groups of investors, indexed by i ∈
{B, S} ≡ {Buyers, Sellers}, that differ only in their risk-free bond endowment,
Ei , and risky asset endowment, D0,i . Specifically, Buyers are endowed with a
sufficiently “underweighted” amount of the risky asset (i.e., D0,B < x) and
therefore wish to buy additional shares. Conversely, Sellers are sufficiently
“overweighted” (i.e., D0,S > x) and therefore wish to sell a portion of their
risky asset portfolio.28 In addition, each investor, i , is endowed with a ba-
sis, P0, used to compute capital gains. Finally, let θ represent the relative
proportion of Sellers in the economy, which is fixed across time. There-
fore, in every period t , per-capita demand for the risky asset must equal
per-capita supply: θ · Dt,S + (1 − θ) · Dt,B = x. This identity implies that the
aggregate change in demand across any number of time periods, r , is equal
to zero:
θ(Dt+r,S − Dt,S) + (1 − θ)(Dt+r,B − Dt,B) = 0, (A.1)
where Dt,i is investor i ’s demand for the risky asset in period t .
In period 1, investors’ expectations about ũ are that it has a normal dis-
tribution with a mean of ū and, without loss of generality, a variance equal
to one. Given these common beliefs, investors trade shares of the risky asset
and risk-free bond at competitive prices.
Investors’ period 1 demand functions are driven by two opposing eco-
nomic forces. First, following Shackelford and Verrecchia [2002], I assume
periods 0 and 1 are sufficiently close in time so that any trading profits from
the sale of assets in period 1 are taxed at an unfavorable short-term capital
gains tax rate, τ . Investors can reduce their taxes by postponing their trad-
ing activity until period 2, when a second round of trade opens. Period 2 is
sufficiently distant in time from period 1 so that any realized trading profits
in this period qualify for a favorable long-term capital gains tax, which is
normalized to zero. Therefore, τ represents the spread between the short-
term and long-term capital gains tax rates and captures the incremental
incentive created by an ITD to postpone trading until period 2.
28 The assumption that investors hold less than an optimal risk-sharing amount is made to
generate trading volume that triggers capital gains taxes. In this model, there are two situations
in which no trade results. First, investors will not trade if they are endowed with an optimal risk-
sharing amount of the risky asset, x (Milgrom and Stokey [1982]). Second, even if investors
are given suboptimal risk-sharing endowments, they may not trade if their initial allocations
are sufficiently close to optimal risk-sharing such that the marginal ITD cost is higher than the
marginal risk-sharing benefit of trading the first share. I avoid this uninteresting scenario by
assuming that investors are “sufficiently” overweighted and underweighted in the risky asset.
Therefore, my model is intended to shed light on how anticipated information incrementally
influences trading volume, given a desire to trade, and is not intended to explain why trading
volume exists.
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Second, investors anticipate they will observe a public signal, ỹ = ũ + ε̃,
between periods 1 and 2. The noise in the signal, ε̃, is independently and
normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a precision (inverse of variance)
of s . The information contained in this signal creates an incentive for risk-
averse investors to trade in period 1 to protect themselves from adverse
price changes in period 2.
The model concludes in period 3 when investors realize the payoff of
the risky asset, pay any capital gains taxes, and consume their remaining
wealth. Investors are risk-averse with a utility for wealth characterized by a
negative exponential utility function, U (W̃i ) = − exp(−W̃i/γ ), where γ is
a risk tolerance parameter common to all investors. W̃i is investor i ’s final
wealth, which is equal to:
W̃i = Ei + P1(D0,i − D1,i ) + P2(D1,i − D2,i ) + ũ · D2,i
−τi (P1 − P0)(D0,i − D1,i ),
(A.2)
where P1 and P2 are the prices of the risky asset and D1,i and D2,i are investor
i ’s demand for the risky asset in periods 1 and 2, respectively. The final term
in equation (A.2) reflects the total amount of capital gains taxes paid by
investor i on realized trading profits in period 1.
The equilibrium price and demand functions in period 1 are solved us-
ing backward induction. In period 2, trader i maximizes his expected utility
with respect to his demand for the risky asset, D2,i , conditional upon observ-
ing the intermediate public signal, ỹ . Because investor i ’s period 1 tax rate,
τi , does not affect this optimization problem, it is straightforward to solve
for the equilibrium in period 2:
P̃2 = ū + s ỹ1 + s −
x
γ (1 + s) , (A.3)
D2,i = x, ∀i. (A.4)
Equations (A.3) and (A.4) are standard for a model of this type in which
all information is public and investors have homogenous risk preferences
(e.g., Verrecchia [1982]). Each investor, regardless of type, holds a share of
the risky asset equal to the per-capita supply, x.29
In period 1, investor i ’s optimization problem is to maximize expected
utility, Ūi , given the period 2 equilibrium price and demand functions:
Max
D1,i
Ūi = Eũ,P̃2 [− exp(−W̃i/γ )].
Substituting the relation D2,i = x (from equation A.4) and using the
moment-generating function for the normal random variables P̃2 and ũ,
29 In the presence of an ITD, investors in this two-period model do eventually achieve an
optimal risk-sharing portfolio prior to the realization of the risky asset payoff. In contrast,
investors in the one-period ITD model of Shackelford and Verrecchia [2002] never reach
such an optimal risk-sharing portfolio.
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investor i ’s problem becomes:
Max
D1,i




[Ei + (P1 (1 − τi ) + P0τi ) · D0,i + (E [P̃2]








Differentiating this expression with respect to D1,i , setting it equal to zero,
and solving for D1,i yields:




In period 1, Sellers will incur a tax, τS = τ , on any trading profits. Con-
versely, Buyers will not pay taxes, τB = 0, on any shares they purchase in
period 1. Consequently, the demand functions of Buyers and Sellers can be
expressed, respectively, as








Applying the market clearing condition and substituting (A.7) and (A.8)
yields:




The unconditional expectation and variance of P̃2 (from equation A.3) are
given, respectively, by:
E [P̃2] = ū − x
γ (1 + s) , (A.10)
Var[P̃2] = s(1 + s) . (A.11)





1 − θτ .
Similarly, substituting (A.10) and (A.11) into (A.7) and (A.8) and simplify-
ing each expression gives:









(1 − θτ) ,
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(1 − θτ) .
By definition, the per-capita trading volume in period 1 is equal to
V1 = 12
∫
|D1,i − D0,i |di
= 1
2
θ |D1,S − D0,S | + 12(1 − θ)|D1,B − D0,B|
= 1
2
[θ(D0,S − D1,S) + (1 − θ)(D1,B − D0,B)],
(A.12)
where the last step follows because Buyers (Sellers) do not sell (buy) shares
in period 1. Substituting (A.1) into (A.12), per-capita trading volume is
expressed in terms of Buyers demand:
V1 = (1 − θ)(D1,B − D0,B). (A.13)
Finally, substituting the (A.10) into (A.13) leads to the following expression
for trading volume in period 1:
V1 = V ∗ − γ θ(1 − θ)
ITD incentive to






where V ∗ = (1 − θ)(x − D0,B) is the optimal risk-sharing trading volume in
period 1 and P1 = P1 − P0 is the capital gain in period 1.
EXPECTED UTILITY AND THE HIRSHLEIFER EFFECT
Substituting the equilibrium relations from (A.6) and (A.11) into (A.5)
and rearranging terms, gives investor i ’s expected utility:
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Differentiating (A.14) with respect to s gives:
∂Ūi
∂s
= − exp{ } ·
[













γ 2(1 + s)2
]
= − exp{ } ·
[
− Var[P̃2] · D1,i
γ 2








(1 + s)2 +
x2




2γ 2(1 + s)2 · (D1,i − x)
2 ≤ 0.
If τ = 0, then D1,i = x, which gives ∂Ūi∂s
∣∣
τ=0 = 0 from the above expression.
If τ > 0, then D1,i = x, which gives ∂Ūi∂s
∣∣




∂s ) < 0.
REFERENCES
AJINKYA, B. B., AND P. C. JAIN. “The Behavior of Daily Stock Market Trading Volume.” Journal
of Accounting and Economics 11 (1989): 331–59.
ALLES, M., AND R. LUNDHOLM. “On the Optimality of Public Signals in the Presence of Private
Information.” Accounting Review 68 (1993): 93–112.
ATIASE, R. K., AND L. S. BAMBER. “Trading Volume Reactions to Annual Accounting Earnings
Announcements.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 17 (1994): 309–29.
ATKINS, A. B., AND E. A. DYL. “Transaction Costs and Holding Periods for Common Stocks.”
Journal of Finance 52 (1997): 309–25.
BAMBER, L. S. “The Information Content of Annual Earnings Releases: A Trading Volume
Approach.” Journal of Accounting Research 24 (1986): 40–56.
BAMBER, L. S. “Unexpected Earnings, Firm Size, and Trading Volume Around Quarterly Earn-
ings Announcements.” Accounting Review 62 (1987): 510–32.
BEAVER, W. H. “The Information Content of Annual Earnings Announcements.” Journal of
Accounting Research 6 (1968): 67–92.
BLOUIN, J. L.; J. S. RAEDY; AND D. A. SHACKELFORD. “Capital Gains Taxes and Equity Trading:
Empirical Evidence.” Journal of Accounting Research 41 (2003): 611–51.
BOLLERSLEV, T.; M. GIBSON; AND H. ZHOU. “Dynamic Estimation of Volatility Risk Premia and
Investor Risk Aversion from Option Implied and Realized Volatilities.” Journal of Econometrics
160 (2011): 235–45.
BUSHMAN, R. M. “Public Disclosure and the Structure of Private Information Markets.,” Journal
of Accounting Research 29 (1991): 261–76.
CAMPBELL, C. M. “Blackwell’s Ordering and Public Information.” Journal of Economic Theory 114
(2004): 179–97.
CHEN, J.; H. HONG; AND J. C. STEIN. “Forecasting Crashes: Trading Volume, Past Returns, and
Conditional Skewness in Stock Prices.” Journal of Financial Economics 61 (2001): 345–81.
CONSTANTINIDES, G. M. “Optimal Stock Trading with Personal Taxes: Implications for Prices
and Abnormal January Returns.” Journal of Financial Economics 13 (1984): 65–89.
CONSTANTINIDES, G. M. “Capital Market Equilibrium with Transaction Costs.” Journal of Political
Economy 94 (1986): 842–62.
A TEST OF THE HIRSHLEIFER EFFECT 65
DAI, Z.; E. L. MAYDEW; D. A. SHACKELFORD; AND H. H. ZHANG. “Capital Gains Taxes and Asset
Prices: Capitalization or Lock In?” Journal of Finance 63 (2008): 709–42.
DIAMOND, D., AND R. E. VERRECCHIA. “Constraints on Short-Selling and Asset Price Adjustment
to Private Information.” Journal of Financial Economics 18 (1987): 277–311.
DIAMOND, D. W. “Optimal Release of Information by Firms.” Journal of Finance 40 (1985):
1071–94.
FALK, H., AND J. C. MILLER. “Amortization of Advertising Expenditures.” Journal of Accounting
Research 15 (1977): 12–22.
FAMA, E. “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work.” Journal of Finance
35 (1970): 383–417.
FAMA, E. “Efficient Capital Markets II.” Journal of Finance 46 (1991): 1575–1617.
FOSTER, N. The FASB and the Capital Markets. The FASB Report. Norwalk, CT: FASB, 2003.
FREEMAN, R. N., AND S. Y. TSE. “A Nonlinear Model of Security Price Responses to Unexpected
Earnings.” Journal of Accounting Research 30 (1992): 185–209.
GAO, P. “Disclosure Quality, Cost of Capital, and Investor Welfare.” The Accounting Review 85
(2010): 1–29.
GHYSELS, E.; P. SANTA-CLARA; AND R. VALKANOV. “Predicting Volatility: Getting the Most Out of
Return Data Sampled at Different Frequencies.” Journal of Econometrics 131 (2006): 59–95.
GHYSELS, E.; A. SINKO; AND R. VALKANOV. “MIDAS Regressions: Further Results and New
Directions.” Econometric Reviews 26 (2007): 53–90.
GONEDES, N. J. “Some Evidence on Investor Actions and Accounting Messages—Part II.”
Accounting Review 46 (1971): 535–51.
HAKANSSON, N. H.; G. KUNKEL; AND J. A. OHLSON. “Sufficient and Necessary Conditions for
Information to Have Social Value in Pure Exchange.” Journal of Finance 37 (1982): 1169–81.
HIRSHLEIFER, J. “The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive
Activity.” American Economic Review 61 (1971): 561–74.
HONG, H.; T. LIM; AND J. C. STEIN. “Bad News Travels Slowly: Size, Analyst Coverage, and the
Profitability of Momentum Strategies.” Journal of Finance 60 (2000): 265–95.
HURTT, D. N., AND J. A. SEIDA. “Do Holding Period Tax Incentives Affect Earnings Release
Period Selling Activity of Individual Investors?” Journal of the American Taxation Association 26
(2004): 43–64.
JIN, L. “Capital Gains Tax Overhang and Price Pressure.” Journal of Finance 61 (2006):
1399–1431.
JUDGE, G. G.; W. E. GRIFFITHS; R. C. HILL; H. LÜTKEPHOHL; AND T.-C. LEE. The Theory and
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